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SECURE GROUP MANAGEMENT FOR PRIVACY-PRESERVING PUBLIC AUDITING OF SHARED CLOUD DATA

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ABSTRACT:

With the increasing adoption of cloud storage services for data sharing and collaboration, ensuring the privacy and integrity of shared data has become a critical concern. In this context, secure group management techniques play a crucial role in facilitating privacypreserving public auditing of shared cloud data. This paper presents a novel framework for secure group management, specifically tailored for enabling privacy-preserving public auditing of shared cloud data. The framework leverages cryptographic primitives and access control mechanisms to ensure that only authorized group members can access and audit the shared data while preserving the privacy of individual users. Additionally, the proposed framework incorporates efficient data verification techniques to enable public auditing of cloud data integrity without revealing the underlying content to unauthorized parties. Through extensive experimentation and evaluation, the effectiveness and scalability of the proposed framework are demonstrated, offering a robust solution for secure group management in the context of privacy-preserving public auditing of shared cloud data.

Keywords: adoption, cloud storage, data sharing, collaboration, integrity.

INTRODUCTION :

In the era of cloud computing, the sharing and collaboration of data among multiple users have become increasingly prevalent. However, this trend brings forth significant challenges related to data privacy, integrity, and security. Particularly in scenarios where sensitive information is shared among multiple parties in the cloud, ensuring secure group

managementbecomes paramount. Additionally, the need for public auditing of shared cloud data to verify its integrity further complicates the matter, as traditional access control mechanisms may not suffice to protect user privacy while enabling transparent data verification. Addressing these challenges requires innovative solutions that can facilitatesecure group management while preserving the privacy of individual users and ensuring the integrity of shared data.

The concept of secure group management for privacy-preserving public auditing of shared cloud data aims to address these challenges by providing a comprehensive framework for managing group access and facilitating transparent data verification in the cloud. This framework encompasses various components, including cryptographic techniques, access control mechanisms, and efficient data verification methods, to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and privacy of shared data. By leveraging advanced cryptographic primitives such as attribute-based encryption (ABE) and homomorphic encryption, the framework enables fine-grained access control and secure data encryption while preserving user privacy.Furthermore, the framework incorporates efficient data verification techniques such as proofs of retrievability (POR) and zero-knowledge proofs (ZKP) to enable auditors to verify the integrity of shared cloud data without accessing the actual content. This ensures that data integrity is maintained while preserving user privacy and confidentiality. Additionally, the decentralized nature of group management in the framework

enhances scalability and resilience, as it allows for distributed identity management and access control across multiple cloud users in the group. Our proposed scheme environments and decentralized systems. This reduces the risk of single points of failure and unauthorized access, enhancing the overall security posture of the system.

In this paper, we present a comprehensive overview of secure group management for privacy-preserving public auditing of shared cloud data, highlighting the challenges, existing approaches, and future directions in this area. We discuss the key components and techniques involved in the proposed framework and explore its implications for enhancing data privacy, integrity, and security in collaborative cloud environments. Through this exploration, we aim to contribute to the ongoing research efforts in secure cloud computing and provide insights into the design and implementation of effective solutions for managing group access and ensuring transparent data verification in shared cloud environments. Auditing and group management solutions in shared cloud environments. for distributed identity management and
access control across multiple cloud
environments and decentralized systems. This
reduces the risk of single points of failure and
unauthorized access, enhancing the overall
security

Fig1:System Architecture

METHODOLOGY :

Let groups G_1 and G_T be multiplicative cyclic groups with prime order p, and $\frac{110 \times 1000}{2}$ let e: $G_1 \times G_1 \rightarrow G_T$ be a bilinear addition, g and u are the generators of G₁. Moreover, H₁: $\{0,1\}^* \rightarrow G_1$ and H₂: G_T \rightarrow Z [∗]p are collision-resistant hash functions. *_p are collision-resistant hash functions. $\Phi = \prod_{i \in IDX} e(\sigma_i, \gamma_i)^{si}$,
Assume that a file F is divided into n data blocks $F = \{m_1, ..., m_n\}$ and there are w users in where $J \in U_L$ the user group $U = \{u_1, u_2, \ldots, u_w\}$, where the modified user u_1 acts as a group manager (GM) and the calculates map. In

others are common users. Let U_L be the set of all legal users, and U_R be the set of all revoked users in the group. Our proposed scheme
consists of six probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms: KeyGen, TagGen , Update, Challenge, Prove, Verify, and

KeyGen. The group manager randomly **Challenge, Prove, Verify, and Revocation.**
 KeyGen. The group manager randomly chooses $a_1 \leftarrow Z^*_{p}$ and calculates $y_1 = g^{a_1}$ as the manager's secret/public key pair and randomly chooses $a_i \leftarrow Z^*$ as the secret key of u_i and calculates $y_i = y_1^{-1/a}$ as the public key of ui.

TagGen. User u_i generates an authenticated tag σ_i on the message block m_i of F as $\sigma_i = (h_{i,j} \cdot u^{mi})^{aj}$

 $\sigma_i = (h_{i,i} \cdot u^{m})^{a_j},$
where $h_{i,j} = H_1(ID||i||j||v_i||t_i)$, ID is the file identifier of F , v_i is the version number, and ti is the time stamp. User u_i uploads $\{m_i,$ σ_i to the CSP, and records additional information to the EDHT. When a data block is modified, the group manager adds the operation information into the MRT and asks the TPA to update the additional information of the block in the EDHT. he time stamp. User u_i uploads $\{m_i,$

e CSP, and records additional

n to the EDHT. When a data block

ed, the group manager adds the

information into the MRT and asks

o update the additional information

k in the E

SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE thblock m_i to m'_i . Then, u_k computes the Update. Suppose that the valid group user u_k modifies the iauthenticated tag σ_i on the modified block m_i as

 $\sigma'_{i}=(h_{i,k} \cdot u^{m'i})^{ak}$,
where $h_{i,j}$

 $k=H_1(ID||i||k||v'_i||t'_i)$, and v'_i and t'_i denote the updated version number and time stamp, respectively. User u_k uploads (m'_1, σ'_1) to the CSP and asks the group manager to update the additional information of the block in the EDHT and MRT. group manager to update the
aation of the block in the
se the challenge process is
of Tian *et al.*'s scheme, a

Challenge. Because the challenge process is the same as that of Tian *et al*.'s scheme, a detailed description is omitted here.

Prove. After receiving the challenge message for the challenged blocks. For the challenge blocks, the CSP calculates the tag proof Φ as the challenged blocks.

blocks, the CSP calculates
 $(y_j)^{s_i}$,

nd the i-thblock is

the j-thuser. The C

$$
\Phi = \prod_{i \in IDX} e(\sigma_i, \gamma_j)^{s_i},
$$

where $j \in U_L$ and the i-thblock is modified by the j -thuser. The CSP then calculates the data proof ν1 as

$$
v_1 = \sum_{i \in IDX} m_i \cdot s_i \cdot H_2(\Theta_1) + r_1,
$$

where $r_1 \in Z^*$ _p is a random number, and Θ_1 =e $(u, y1)^{r}$. These values are used to protect data and sends privacy against the TPA.

For all RU-blocks, the CSP calculates the tag proof T as follows:

$$
T=\prod_{i\in D}(e(\sigma_i,\tau_j))^{\beta_i}
$$

where $j \in U_R$ and the i-thblock is modified by the j -thuser. The CSP then calculates the data proof ν2 as These values are used to protect data

against the TPA.

RU-blocks, the CSP calculates the tag

as follows:
 $e(\sigma_i, \tau_j))^{\beta_i}$,
 $\in U_R$ and the i-thblock is modified by

user. The CSP then calculates the data

2 as
 $m_i \cdot \beta$

$$
\nu_2=\sum_{i\in D}m_i\cdot \beta_i\cdot H_2(\Theta_2)+r_2,
$$

where r₂∈Z^{*}_p is a random number, and Θ_2 =e as (u, y₁)^{r2}. These values are used to protect data $\Lambda = \Lambda/e$ (σ_i , privacy against the TPA. Finally, Finally, the CSP sends the proof P= { Φ , T, Λ , authentical privacy against the TPA.

privacy against the TPA.
Finally, the CSP sends the proof $P = \{\Phi, T, \Lambda\}$ authenticator Λ to the C $v_1, v_2, \Theta_1, \Theta_2$ } to the TPA.

Verify. With the proofthat P= $\{\Phi, T, \Lambda, \nu_1, \nu_2, \sigma_1\}$ Θ1, Θ2},the TPA verifies the integrity of the chosen blocks. If there is no revoked user or all RU-blocks have been modified by the other users in U_L , the TPA can then verify the revocation correctness of the data file; otherwise, the TPA verifies the post-revocation authenticator by computing the following equation: $\Lambda = T^{\eta, \varepsilon/w}$ manager also With the proof that $P = \{ \Phi, T, \Lambda, v_1, v_2, \}$, the TPA verifies the integrity of the revocation blocks. If there is no revoked user or blocks have been modified by the other in U_L, the TPA can then verify the revocation

If does not hold, the TPA outputs Reject; otherwise, it can be verified as

$$
\Theta_1^{\,w}\cdot\Phi^{H_2(\Theta_1)}=e(\prod_{i\in IDX}h_{i,j}^{s_i\cdot H_2(\Theta_1)}\cdot u^{v_1},y_1)^w,\\ \Theta_2^{\,\eta\cdot w}\cdot T^{\eta\cdot\epsilon\cdot H_2(\Theta_2)}=e(\prod_{i\in D}h_{i,j}^{\lambda_i\cdot H_2(\Theta_2)}\cdot u^{v_2\cdot\eta},y_1)^w,
$$

where $h_{i,j} = H_1(ID||i||j||v_i||t_i)$. If hold, the TPA message chair, and outputs Accept; otherwise, it outputs Reject. Show the settlem

Revocation. Our scheme provides two types of revocation: lazy revocation (LR) and active revocation (AR). With the LR method, when user uk needs to be revoked, the group manager sends a revocation message to the CSP as follows: Our scheme provides two types

: lazy revocation (LR) and active

AR). With the LR method, when

s to be revoked, the group

ds a revocation message to the updates the

ws:

ED}},

the index set of the blocks

by the revo

 $\Psi = \{y_k^q, \{\theta_i | i \in D\}\},\$

where D is the index set of the blocks modified by the revoked user u_k,and q∈Z^{*}_q and $\theta_i \in Z^*_{q}(i \in D)$ are random numbers. Upon receiving the revocation message, the CSP aggregates the corresponding to index set D as

$$
\Lambda' = \prod_{i \in D} e(\sigma_i, y_k^q)^{\theta_i},
$$

and sends Λ' to the group manager. The group
manager then generates the postmanager then generates thepost revocationauthenticator Λ and its parameter λ_i as

 $Λ = Λ'$ ^ρ,

Λ= Λ^{΄ ρ},
λi=q⋅ρ⋅θ_i, i∈D,

where ρ is a random number. Finally, the group manager sends $(R, \{\lambda_i | i \in D\})$, where R is the index set of the RU-blocks to the TPA.

When a data block m_i modified by the revoked user u_k is modified by another legal user, the TPA updates the post-revocation authenticator as J-blocks to the TPA.
modified by the revoked
another legal user, the
revocation authenticator
sends the post-

λi

 $\Lambda = \Lambda / e \left(\sigma_i, y_k \right)^{\lambda_1}.$
Finally, the TPA sends the postauthenticator Λ to the CSP.

With the AR method, when user u_k needs to be revoked, the process of creating the postrevocation authenticator Λ is the same as in
the LR method, but the subsequent process is
different. First, the group manager chooses the the LR method, but the subsequent process is different. First, the group manager chooses the parameters z_{0i} , all i \in D, computes the all i \in D, computes the the the revocation factor z_i as $z_i = z_{0i}/z_{1i}$, and updates the public key y_k of user u_k as y^{z_1} i_k. The group generates the challenge message chal and sends all revocation manager also generates the challenge
message chal and sends all revocation
factors z_i with the challenge message chal to the CSP. Then, the CSP re-computes the tag for the data block handled by the revoked user $\sigma_i = \sigma_i^{\text{zi}}$ and the proof P for the challenge message chal, and sends the proof P to the group manager. With proof P, the group manager verifies the integrity of the chosen blocks. z_{1i} for computes the tag
by the revoked
for the challenge
ne proof P to the

If it is valid, the group manager sends the revocation factor z_{0i} to the TPA. The TPA then updates the revocation factor in the EDHT and the post-authenticator Λ as verifies the integrity of the chosen
valid, the group manager sends the
on factor z_{0i} to the TPA. The TPA then
the revocation factor in the EDHT and
authenticator Λ as
 $\prod_{i\in D} e(\sigma_i, y_k)^{\lambda_i/z_{0i}}$.
the TPA sends the

$$
\Lambda = \Lambda / \prod_{i \in D} e(\sigma_i, y_k)^{\lambda_i / z_{0i}}
$$

Finally, the TPA sends the postauthenticator Λ to the CSP.

A. CORRECTNESS

The correctness of our scheme can be proved as follows: $\Theta_1^W \cdot \Phi^{H_2(\Theta_1)}$

$$
= e(u, y_1)^{r_1w} \cdot \prod_{i \in IDX} ((e(\sigma_i, y_j))^{x_i})^{H_2(\Theta_1)},
$$

\n
$$
= e(u, y_1)^{r_1w} \cdot \prod_{i \in IDX} e((h_{i,j} \cdot u^{m_i})^{a_j}, g^{w \cdot a_1/a_j})^{s_i H_2(\Theta_1)}
$$

\n
$$
= e(u, y_1)^{r_1w} \cdot \prod_{i \in IDX} e((h_{i,j} \cdot u^{m_i}), y_1^{w_i})^{s_i H_2(\Theta_1)},
$$

\n
$$
= e(u, y_1)^{r_1w} \cdot (\prod_{i \in IDX} e(h_{i,j}, y_1^{w_i})^{s_i H_2(\Theta_1)}),
$$

\n
$$
\cdot \prod_{i \in IDX} e(u^{m_i s_i H_2(\Theta_1)}, y_1^w)
$$

\n
$$
= (\prod_{i \in IDX} e(h_{i,j}^{s_i H_2(\Theta_1)}, y_1^w)) \cdot e(u^{\sum m_i s_i H_2(\Theta_1)}, y_1^w)
$$

\n
$$
= (\prod_{i \in IDX} e(h_{i,j}^{s_i H_2(\Theta_1)}, y_1^w)) \cdot e(u^{\sum m_i s_i H_2(\Theta_1)}, y_1^w)
$$

\n
$$
= (\prod_{i \in IDX} e(h_{i,j}^{s_i H_2(\Theta_1)}, y_1^w)) \cdot e(u^{v_1}, y_1)^w
$$

\n
$$
= e(\prod_{i \in IDX} h_{i,j}^{s_i H_2(\Theta_1)}, u^{v_1}, y_1)^w
$$

\n
$$
\Theta_2^{\eta \cdot w} \cdot T^{\eta \cdot \varepsilon \cdot H_2(\Theta_2)}
$$

\n
$$
= e(u, y_1)^{r_2 \cdot \eta \cdot w} \cdot \prod_{i \in ID} ((e(\sigma_i, \tau_j))^{\beta_i})^{\eta \cdot \varepsilon \cdot H_2(\Theta_2)}
$$

\n
$$
= e(u, y_1)^{r_2 \cdot \eta \cdot w} \cdot (\prod_{i \in D} e((h_{i,j} \cdot u^{m_i}), y_1^w)^{\beta_i \cdot \eta \cdot H_2(\Theta_2)})
$$

\n
$$
\cdot \prod_{i \in
$$

$$
= (\prod_{i \in D} e(h_{i,j}^{\lambda_i H_2(\Theta_2)}, y_1^w)) \cdot e(u^{v_2 \cdot \eta}, y_1)^w
$$

= $e(\prod_{i \in D} h_{i,j}^{\lambda_i H_2(\Theta_2)} \cdot u^{v_2 \cdot \eta}, y_1)^w$

System Model and Initialization

Entities Involved Data Owner the entity that generates and uploads the data to the cloud. Cloud Server (CS)the entity that stores the Cloud Server (CS) the entity that stores the data and responds to audit requests. Third-Party Auditor (TPA) The entity that performs audits to verify data integrity.Group Members Users who have shared access to the data. Setup Phase the DO initializes the system by generating cryptographic keys.A public key Setup Phase the DO initializes the system by
generating cryptographic keys.A public key
and a private key pair are generated using a secure key generation algorithm.Public parameters necessary for auditing are shared with the CS and TPA. Auditor (TPA) The entity that performs
to verify data integrity.Group Members
who have shared access to the data.

Data Upload and Integrity Tags

Data Division the DO divides the data into multiple blocks and generates a unique tag for
each block using cryptographic hash functions. each block using cryptographic hash functions. Homomorphic authenticator schemes (e.g., homomorphic signatures) are used to generate
integrity tags that allow computation on integrity tags that allow computation on encrypted data.

Privacy-Preserving Auditing Protocol

 Audit Initiation the TPA initiates an audit by sending a challenge request to the CS. The challenge typically includes random indices of the data blocks to be verified. Proof Generation the CS computes a proof of data possession by combining the requested data blocks and their corresponding tags using homomorphic properties.The proof is then sent possession by combining the requested data
blocks and their corresponding tags using
homomorphic properties. The proof is then sent
to the TPA. Proof Verification the TPA verifies the proof without needing to access the actual data. Techniques such as bilinear pairings or zero-knowledge proofs can be used for verification. If the proof is valid, it indicates that the data is intact. in the TPA initiates an audit by
lenge request to the CS. The
ally includes random indices of
cks to be verified. Proof
CS computes a proof of data knowledge proofs can be used
Figure 1. If the proof is valid, it
clata is intact.
Annagement
fanagementa group key is

Secure Group Management

Group Key Managementa group key is established for secure communication among group members.Techniques such as group key agreement protocols or hierarchical key management schemes are employed to securely distribute and update group keys. Access ControlAttribute-based access control (ABAC) or role-based access control (RBAC) established for secure communia
group members.Techniques such
agreement protocols or hiera
management schemes are e
securely distribute and update
Access ControlAttribute-based a
(ABAC) or role-based access con

mechanisms are implemented to manage permissions and access rights of group members.Member RevocationWhen a member leaves the group, the group key is updated to prevent the revoked member from accessing the data.Efficient key update mechanisms, such as proxy re-encryption or broadcast encryption, are used to ensure forward and backward secrecy. mechanisms are implemented to manage
permissions and access rights of group
members. Member Revocation When a member
leaves the group, the group key is updated to
prevent the revoked member from accessing
the data. Efficie

Data Integrity and Security Measures

Merkle trees are used to efficiently verify the integrity of data blocks. The root hash of the Fig3:1 Merkle tree is used as a commitment to the data set. Batch auditing techniques allow the TPA to handle multiple audit requests simultaneously, reducing computational overhead. Dynamic Data Operations system supports dynamic operations such as auditing
data insertion delation and modification promise data insertion, deletion, and modification while maintaining data integrity. Index structures, such as authenticated skip lists or hash tables, can be used to manage dynamic data. Merkle trees are used to efficiently verify the
integrity of data blocks. The root hash of the Fig3:I
Merkle tree is used as a commitment to the r
data set. Batch auditing techniques allow the
TPA to handle multiple audit dynamic operations such as
deletion, and modification
ng data integrity. Index
as authenticated skip lists or
be used to manage dynamic

Security Analysis and Optimization Security Analysis and Optimization

Resistance to Attacksthe system is designed to resist various attacks, including replay attacks, collusion attacks, and insider threats. Techniques such as random masking, challenge-response protocols, and secure key management help mitigate these threats. Performance Optimizationthe methodology focuses on optimizing performance by reducing communication and computation costs. Efficient cryptographic operations, interfaces, a
parallel processing and lightweight protocols decentralized parallel processing, and lightweight protocols are implemented to enhance system performance. Attacks the system is designed to

bus attacks, including replay attacks,

attacks, and insider threats.

Such as random masking, flexible sc

response protocols, and secure key

entichelp mitigate these threats.

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Fig2:Data upload and audit process

revocation (AR) processes. Fig3:Lazy revocation (LR) and active

FUTURE ENHANCEMENT :

integrity of data broads. The reach that is particular the parallel policies are the stated and the material and the stated are the stated and the stated are the stated are the stated and in the stated are the stated are Looking ahead, the future of secure group management for privacy-preserving public auditing of shared cloud data holds significant for further innovation and advancement. One key direction for future research involves the exploration and development of more efficient and scalable cryptographic techniques for access control and data verification. Advancements in areas such as attribute-based encryption (ABE), homomorphic encryption, and zero-knowledge proofs (ZKP) could lead to more robust and flexible solutions for enforcing fine-grained access control policies while preserving user privacy and data confidentiality. Additionally, research efforts aimed at enhancing the usability and practicality of secure group management systems through improved user interfaces, access control policies, and identity management mechanisms could further accelerate the adoption and deployment of these solutions in real-world cloud environments. Looking ahead, the future of secure group
management for privacy-preserving public
auditing of shared cloud data holds significant
promise for further innovation and
advancement. One key direction for future
research invol arch efforts aimed at enhancing the
ility and practicality of secure group
agement systems through improved user
faces, access control policies, and
ntralized identity management
hanisms could further accelerate the
tition

OUTPUTS technologies such as blockchain and federated Moreover, the integration of emerging learning holds great promise for enhancing the security and privacy of group management systems in shared cloud environments. By leveraging blockchain technology to establish decentralized and tamper-proof ledgers of access control policies and user identities, organizations can enhance the transparency and integrity of group management operations while mitigating the risk of unauthorized access and data exposure. Similarly, federated such as blockchain and federated
s great promise for enhancing the
privacy of group management
shared cloud environments. By
ockchain technology to establish
and tamper-proof ledgers of learning techniques enable organizations to collaboratively train machine learning models on encrypted user data without compromising individual privacy, offering a scalable and privacy-preserving approach to group management and data analysis in cloud environments. Overall, the future of secure group management for privacy-preserving public auditing of shared cloud data is characterized by ongoing innovation and collaboration, driven by the goal of ensuring confidentiality, integrity, and privacy in collaborative cloud environments.

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